THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON ELECTRICITY GENERATION AND FUEL SUPPLY IN 2050: A STUDY OF LOUISIANA, CALIFORNIA, NEW YORK, AND WASHINGTON’S CONVENTIONAL GRID by Burns, Diana A.
THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON ELECTRICITY 
GENERATION AND FUEL SUPPLY IN 2050: A STUDY OF 






























In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Master of Science in Environmental Engineering in the 










COPYRIGHT © 2021 BY DIANA BURNS 
THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON ELECTRICITY 
GENERATION AND FUEL SUPPLY IN 2050: A STUDY OF 






























Dr. Emily Grubert, Advisor 
School of Civil and Environmental 
Engineering 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 Dr. Xing Xie 
School of Civil and Environmental 





Dr. John Taylor 
School of Civil and Environmental 
Engineering 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 Dr. Iris Tien  
School Civil and Environmental 
Engineering 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
   






I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Emily Grubert, for her support and help throughout 
the past two years as her research assistant. I have learned a great deal about the issues 
facing the energy industry in the United States and I am thankful for the opportunity. 
Additionally, I would like to thank those in my research group for their advice and 















TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv 
LIST OF TABLES vii 
LIST OF FIGURES viii 
LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS xi 
SUMMARY xii 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1 
1.1 Climate Change Effects 1 
1.2 The Conventional Power Grid 1 
1.2.1 Thermal power plants 2 
1.2.2 Natural gas 3 
1.2.3 Hydroelectric plants 3 
1.3 Grid Reliability 3 
1.4 Research Gap 4 
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 6 
2.1 Climate Change Effects on the Conventional Grid 6 
2.1.1 Droughts 6 
2.1.2 Extreme temperatures 7 
2.1.3 Storms 8 
2.2 Current State of Reliability 9 
2.2.1 Resource adequacy 9 
2.2.2 Generation performance and availability 10 
2.2.3 Current planning 10 
2.3 Relevance to Current Events 11 
2.3.1 2011 and 2021 Texas outage 11 
2.3.2 2020 California rolling blackouts 12 
2.3.3 Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico 12 
2.4 State Profiles 13 
2.4.1 Louisiana 15 
2.4.2 California 17 
2.4.3 New York 19 
2.4.4 Washington 21 
CHAPTER 3. METHODS 23 
3.1 Outage Data 23 
3.2 State Profiles 23 
CHAPTER 4. RESULTS 29 
4.1 Outage Trends 29 
4.2 Case Studies 31 
 vi 
4.2.1 Seasonal patterns for all states 31 
4.2.2 Potential ramping needs and available reserves 34 
4.2.3 Extreme heat impacts on thermoelectric power plants 37 
4.2.4 Hydroelectric power plants 39 
4.2.5 Extreme cold event effects on natural gas supply loss 41 
CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION 44 
5.1 Trends in vulnerability from past outages 44 
5.2 State Profiles 44 
5.2.1 2050 projected load curves and planning reserve margins 44 
5.2.2 Ramping 46 
5.2.3 Reserves 47 
5.2.4 Extreme heat impacts on natural gas combined cycle plants 47 
5.2.5 Extreme heat and drought conditions on cooling water for thermal power plants
 48 
5.2.6 Hydroelectric plants 50 
5.2.7 Natural gas supply 50 
5.3 Limitations 52 




LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1 Maximum projected percent reduction in hydropower generation for 





LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1 2019 electricity purchases per state by end use sector. Calculations 
completed using EIA data.  
14 
Figure 2 2019 natural gas consumption per state by end use sector. 
Calculations completed using EIA data (EIA, 2019).2019 natural gas 
consumption per state by end use sector. 
14 
Figure 3 Projected (current and proposed) power plants in Louisiana in 2050 
by fuel type and nameplate capacity. Mississippi River is shown in 
blue. Map is adapted from EIA form 860 (Form EIA-860 Detailed 
Data with Previous Form Data (EIA-860A/860B), 2020).Projected 
(current and proposed) power plants in Louisiana in 2050 by fuel 
type and nameplate capacity. 
16 
Figure 4 Projected (current and proposed) power plants in California in 2050 
by fuel type and nameplate capacity. Map is adapted from EIA form 
860 (Form EIA-860 Detailed Data with Previous Form Data (EIA-
860A/860B), 2020).Projected (current and proposed) power plants in 
California in 2050 by fuel type and nameplate capacity. 
18 
Figure 5 Projected (current and proposed) power plants in New York in 2050 
by fuel type and nameplate capacity. Map is adapted from EIA form 
860 (Form EIA-860 Detailed Data with Previous Form Data (EIA-
860A/860B), 2020).Projected (current and proposed) power plants in 
New York in 2050 by fuel type and nameplate capacity. 
20 
Figure 6 Projected (current and proposed) power plants in Washington in 
2050 by fuel type and nameplate capacity. Columbia River is shown 
in blue. Map is adapted from EIA form 860Projected (current and 
proposed) power plants in Washington in 2050 by fuel type and 
nameplate capacity. 
22 
Figure 7 "Major disturbances" of the US power grid from 2002 through 2020. 
Data was collected from archived data from EIA’s Electric Power 
Monthly. Orange indicates an outage caused by a fuel supply issue. 
Blue indicates an outage caused by a transmission issue."Major 
disturbances" of the US power grid from 2002 through 2020. 
29 
Figure 8 Outages from 2002-2020 per month by root cause: fuel supply or 
transmission. Data was collected from archived data from EIA’s 
Electric Power Monthly. Orange indicates an outage caused by a fuel 
30 
 ix 
supply issue. Blue indicates an outage caused by a transmission 
issue.Outages from 2002-2020 per month 
Figure 9 Outages from 2002-2020 per hour of the day by root cause: fuel 
supply or transmission. Data was collected from archived data from 
EIA’s Electric Power Monthly. Orange indicates an outage caused 
by a fuel supply issue. Blue indicates an outage caused by a 
transmission issue.Outages from 2002-2020 per hour of the day by 
root cause: fuel supply or transmission. 
31 
Figure 10 0. 2050 daily average seasonal loads. The load in MWh is plotted 
against each hour of the day, 0 through 23. Summer is indicated in 
blue, fall is indicated in red, winter is indicated in black, and spring 
is indicated in green.2050 daily average seasonal load curves 
31 
Figure 12 2050 daily average seasonal planning reserve margins. The planning 
reserve margin is plotted against each hour of the day, 0 through 23. 
Summer is indicated in blue, fall is indicated in red, winter is 
indicated in black, and spring is indicated in green.2050 daily 
average seasonal planning reserve margins. 
        33 
Figure 13 2050 average daily seasonal potential ramping needs. The percent 
load difference per hour is plotted against each hour of the day, 0 
through 23. Summer is indicated in blue, fall is indicated in red, 
winter is indicated in black, and spring is indicated in green.2050 
average daily seasonal potential ramping needs. 
35 
Figure 14 2050 available flexible reserves to meet ramping needs, per season, 
per hour. Flexible reserve, as a percentage of load at that time, is 
plotted against each hour of the day, 0 through 23. Summer is 
indicated in blue, fall is indicated in red, winter is indicated in black, 
and spring is indicated in green.2050 available flexible reserves to 
meet ramping needs, per season, per hour. 
36 
Figure 15 Average hourly summer reserve margins per state after accounting 
for increased demand and decreased natural gas combined cycle 
power plant capacity from extreme heat events. Louisiana is 
indicated in green, California is indicated in yellow, New York is 
indicated in gray, and Washington is indicated in blue. 
37 
Figure 16 California’s natural gas power plants (orange) by nameplate capacity 
and projected number of days in 2050 with a heat index of 105° F or 
greater. Projected heat index data was obtained from 
climatetoolbox.org. 
38 
Figure 17 Louisiana’s natural gas power plants (orange) by nameplate capacity 
and projected number of days in 2050 with a heat index of 105° F or 
greater. Projected heat index data was obtained from 
39 
 x 
climatetoolbox.org.Louisiana’s natural gas power plants (orange) by 
nameplate capacity and projected number of days in 2050 with a heat 
index of 105° F or greater. 
Figure 18 Figure 18. Average hourly reserve margins per season for California 
and Washington after accounting for projected 2050 decreases in 
hydropower generation according to the values outlined in Table 1. 
Reserve margins without any climate effects are indicated by solid 
lines. Reserve margins including decreased hydropower generation 
are indicated by dashed lines. Summer is indicated in blue. Fall is 
indicated in orange. 
40 
Figure 19 Figure 19. Projected average hourly reserve margins in winter and 
fall for all states after accounting for 50% loss in natural gas supply. 
Reserve margins without any climate effects are indicated by solid 
lines. Reserve margins including decreased hydropower generation 
are indicated by dashed lines. Winter is indicated in black. Fall is 





LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
EDF Environmental Defense Fund  
EIA Energy Information Administration 
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
NERC North American Electric Reliability Council  
NREL National Renewable Energy Laboratory 
PRM Planning Reserve Margin 
US United States 
WEFOR Weighted-Equivalent Generation Forced Outage Rate  
 xii 
SUMMARY 
Climate change due to increased greenhouse gas emissions can impact energy 
infrastructure in a variety of ways. Climate impacts on power grid reliability in 2050 for 
Louisiana, California, New York, and Washington were studied in this paper. Projected 
electric loads, reserve margins, ramping needs, and flexible reserves were calculated for 
each state in 2050 to form a baseline to analyze the effect of extreme temperatures and 
drought on electricity generation and fuel supply, which can in turn impact grid reliability. 
Reduced capacity of natural gas combined cycle power plants from increased heat, 
combined with increased electrical demand, is projected to affect all states, especially 
California and Louisiana. These states also are projected to have some of the most severe 
heat in the country in 2050. Reduced thermal plant capacity from increased cooling water 
temperatures or low cooling water supply is an issue, however its effects on in-state 
generation in these states is projected to be minimal. Decreases in hydropower generation 
are also projected to have minimal effect on all states, however it had the greatest impact 
on California. Lastly, natural gas supply loss is projected to impact all states, especially 
Louisiana and California. Overall, geographic location, seasons, time of day, fuel mix, and 
policy are all factors to be considered when analysing the effects of climate change on the 





CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Climate Change Effects  
Climate change, caused by increasing greenhouse gas emissions throughout the world, has, 
and will continue to have, deleterious effects on energy infrastructure in the US (Romero-
Lankao et al., 2014). According to the IPCC’s fifth assessment report, the US has 
experienced severe heat events, fewer frost days, and increased intense precipitation at 
greater rates because of climate change (Romero-Lankao et al., 2014). The frequency and 
severity of these events is expected to increase in the coming years (Romero-Lankao et al., 
2014). Additionally, the US will experience higher sea levels combined with increased 
storm frequency, more frequent and intense droughts, and unpredictability in rainfall 
patterns (Romero-Lankao et al., 2014). These effects have the potential to impact the 
current electricity generation and transmission systems in the US.  
1.2 The Conventional Power Grid 
This paper will focus on climate change effects on the conventional power grid in the US, 
with a focus on four states: Louisiana, California, New York, and Washington. Here we 
define the conventional grid as centralized points of generation (i.e., power plants) and the 
transmission and distribution system that connects them to customers. These centralized 
points of generation require the presence of a fuel source, whether that be natural gas, coal, 
water, wind, solar, etc., to generate electricity. After the point of generation, electricity 
moves through a network of substations, transmission, and distribution lines, in which it is 
then delivered to the customer. In the US, as of 2019, there are over 10,000 power plants, 
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nearly 700,000 miles of transmission lines, 6.3 million miles of distribution lines, and 
22,000 substations (EIA, 2020a). These extensive infrastructure systems are susceptible to 
environmental stressors brought on by climate change. This paper will expand on climate 
change effects on thermal and hydroelectric power plants, as well as effects specific to 
natural gas as fuel source.  
1.2.1 Thermal power plants 
Thermal power plants utilize heat to generate electricity. These plants can use nuclear, 
biomass, natural gas, coal, or other fuel sources to provide heat to create steam. These 
steam plants then require a medium to condense the steam created during combustion. 
Typically, this cooling has been achieved using water. The electric power generation sector 
accounts for 40% of water withdrawals in the US (Grubert & Sanders, 2018). Water, 
usually from a nearby surface water source, is withdrawn, used to cool and condense the 
steam, and the majority is then released back into the water source. This is known as once 
through cooling. Recirculating cooling systems intake water, and once it is used, it is stored 
in a cooling tower, or other mechanism, to cool. It is then reused to condense steam once 
it cools to a proper temperature. This type of system withdraws much less water from the 
source than a once through system. A newer type of cooling system is dry cooling. This 
system uses significantly less water (95%), but instead uses cool air to condense steam 
(Ray, 2018). It is less efficient than water-based cooling systems, however in areas where 
there are water supply constraints, it is gaining traction. The majority of thermal power 
plants, 61%, use recirculating cooling systems (Ray, 2018).  
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1.2.2 Natural gas 
Natural gas is used to generate about a third of the electricity in the US, however only about 
20-30% of consumed natural gas is used to generate electricity as there are other uses for 
the fuel itself (EIA, 2020b). This includes for heating and cooking in the residential and 
commercial sector, as well as for industrial uses and as a transportation fuel (EIA, 2020b). 
Natural gas is processed and transported through pipelines to be delivered to power plants 
for electricity generation, or directly to the customer.  
1.2.3 Hydroelectric plants 
Hydroelectric power plants do not utilize a heat source, but instead utilize moving water to 
produce electricity (EIA, 2021). Hydropower is considered a renewable source of 
electricity as it relies on the natural hydrologic cycle of water bodies as its fuel. Flow of 
water in rivers, or the falling of water from a reservoir, is harnessed to turn a turbine and 
generate electricity (EIA, 2021).  
1.3 Grid Reliability  
As electricity is generated and consumed instantaneously, it is important to maintain an 
equal supply and demand. An imbalance will cause brownouts or blackouts, and 
widespread power outages greatly affect residents, businesses, and services that all depend 
on electricity (Wang, 2019). As modern society increasingly relies on electricity, an 
unreliable power grid will negatively impact those living and working within it. This 
becomes even more apparent as extreme temperature events are instances in which electric 
cooling and heating demands are at their highest and most needed. IPCC’s fifth assessment 
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report specifies that there is currently little “proactive adaptation” to the impacts of climate 
change, specifically in the energy industry (Romero-Lankao et al., 2014). Therefore, long 
term planning for these effects is pertinent.  
1.4 Research Gap  
Current literature, as discussed further below, has focused on the effects climate change 
can have on hydropower, fossil fuel, and thermal power plants, however little has been 
done to combine future electric loads, climate trends, and climate effects on these systems 
in the future, specifically on an hourly basis.  
Specific climate change impacts on hydropower generation have been studied at a global 
scale (Hamududu & Killingtveit, 2012), US scale (Kao et al., 2015), and regional scale  
(Madani & Lund, 2010; Markoff & Cullen, 2008). Regional and seasonal differences have 
been compounded and studied as well (Boehlert et al., 2016; Sale et al., 2012). However, 
these studies do not incorporate daily changes in load to see when climate change impacts 
on hydropower have the potential to make the bulk power system most vulnerable. 
Similar studies have been performed on the impacts on thermoelectric power plants. These 
include at the global scale (Van Vliet et al., 2016), US scale (van Vliet & Ludwig, 2012), 
and plant scale (Forster et al., 2010; Sieber, 2013). 
It has also been studied that climate change will likely increase electricity demand (Allen 
et al., 2016; McFarland et al., 2015; Sailor, 2001). 
Few studies have compounded the effects of climate, increased demand, and fuel mix 
changes on the grid. Studies have been done at the US (Craig et al., 2018) and regional 
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scales (Miara et al., 2017; Ralston Fonseca et al., 2021). None of these, however, 
incorporate these effects on hourly loads at the state level.  
This paper will focus on the climate change effects of extreme temperatures and drought 
on generator reliability of the conventional grid, specifically thermo and hydroelectric 
power plants. I will focus my analysis on the projected 2050 electricity demand and 
generation for four states in the US: Louisiana, California, New York, and Washington 
using NREL’s Cambium (Cambium | Standard Scenarios 2020 | Cambium Scenarios 
(Hourly and Annual Data), n.d.). These four states are located in four distinct regions of 
the country, all of which will be affected by climate change to various degrees. These states 
also have different electricity demands, fuel mixes, and policies that will shape their future 
generation system.  
In chapter 2, I will focus on what effects of climate change can impact energy 
infrastructure, how climate change can affect the conventional grid and thermo and 
hydroelectric generation, the current issues relating to grid reliability, and how this topic is 
relevant in the US at this time.  
In chapter 3, I will outline the methods used to perform forecasting analyses for each state 
incorporating certain climate change effects on fuel supply and power generation.  
In chapter 4 and 5, I will present my results and discuss the characteristics of each state 
that could impact their future grid reliability, such as daily load curves, ramping needs, and 
potential reserves. Additionally, I will discuss the potential vulnerabilities of each state’s 
thermal and hydroelectric power plants from the impacts of the increased heat, cold, and 
drought that is possible due to climate change.  
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CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND  
2.1 Climate Change Effects on the Conventional Grid   
As the conventional power grid relies on multiple physical systems or resources, such as 
fossil fuels, thermal power plants, transmission lines, etc., the effects of climate change can 
impact these systems in a variety of ways. This chapter investigates droughts, extreme 
temperatures, and storms as key examples of such impacts. 
2.1.1 Droughts  
Thermoelectric generation, specifically plants that use wet cooling systems, require a 
significant amount of water to operate; 40% of water withdrawals in the US are for 
electricity generation (Grubert & Sanders, 2018). Increased droughts or fluctuation in 
surface water supplies will affect the availability of this water. Lower water levels at the 
source can make generation less efficient (Argonne National Laboratory, 2012). 43% of 
thermal plants in the US have intake heights for their cooling water supply at less than ten 
feet below the typical water height of the source (Dumas et al., 2019). A few feet of 
variation for a thermal plant’s water supply source can translate to minimal or no ability 
for a plant to meet its cooling water needs. This point was illustrated in the summer of 2012 
when a power plant in the Midwest shut down as its water supply fell below the height of 
its intake pipes (Eaton, 2012).  
Hydroelectric plants are also affected by drought or changing patterns in the water cycle. 
Lower rates of stream flow or lower water levels in reservoirs correlate to lower power 
output (Kao et al., 2015). Currently, forecasted low flow levels in the Colorado River are 
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projecting low water levels in Lake Mead, the location of the Hoover Dam (Metz, 2021). 
These low levels are expected to reduce the generation of the Hoover Dam in the coming 
months. 
Even if water is not the “fuel” used for generation, it is still an integral part of electricity 
generation for the conventional grid. Increased droughts and decreased precipitation can 
affect the ability of thermal and hydro power plants to generate electricity.  
2.1.2 Extreme temperatures 
According to the IPCC’s fifth assessment report, it is “very likely” (90-100% probability) 
that the temperature has increased throughout North America in the past century and the 
US has experienced an increase in severe heat events (Romero-Lankao et al., 2014). For 
natural gas-fired power plants, increased ambient air temperatures can reduce their 
efficiency (Petrakopoulou et al., 2020). Additionally, increased temperatures of cooling 
water sources can reduce the capacity of thermal power plants (van Vliet & Ludwig, 2012). 
In the summer of 2012, a nuclear reactor in Connecticut was forced to shut down as 
temperatures of the Long Island sound, its cooling water source, were too high (Eaton, 
2012). Extreme heat events lead to increased electricity demand, further stressing 
equipment that is already performing under reduced capacity (Dumas et al., 2019). 
Thermoelectric generation is susceptible to the effects of extreme heat events, however 
electricity needs are likely to be highest during these times.  
Extreme cold events can also have negative consequences. Natural gas production can 
cease at the wellhead if cold temperatures freeze water or other liquids that are present in 
natural gas in the well or in gathering lines before processing (York, 2021). This freezing 
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will block the flow of gas for processing and delivery. Without sufficient gas supply, 
natural gas-fired power plants are at risk of shutting down during these times. Additionally, 
equipment at power plants that are not winterized can freeze and cause generators to trip 
offline. This was seen in the 2011 Texas power outage, which will be discussed further in 
section 2.3.1.  
Extreme heat and cold can also affect the transmission and distribution systems. Increased 
temperatures can increase energy losses and reduce capacity ratings for transmission and 
distribution cables (Argonne National Laboratory, 2012) (Ward, 2013). They can also 
accelerate the aging of electrical equipment, as well as lead to equipment failure because 
of the increased demand loads that the equipment is not designed to handle (Dumas et al., 
2019). Under icy conditions, ice on overhead lines can cause them to collapse (Dumas et 
al., 2019). 
2.1.3 Storms  
Transmission and distribution infrastructure mainly consists of overhead power lines that 
are susceptible to the environment. Increased frequency of storms and/or more severe 
storms can impact the transmission and distribution systems by damaging overhead lines 
from flying debris or downed poles (Dumas et al., 2019) (Ward, 2013). Additionally, 
flooding and/or sea level rise can damage electrical equipment at substations or 




2.2 Current State of Reliability  
NERC, the North American Electric Reliability Council, is an agency put in place to ensure 
the reliability of the power grid in North America. NERC measures reliability of the power 
grid by four indicators: resource adequacy, transmission performance and availability, 
generation performance and availability, and system protection and disturbance 
performance. (NERC, 2020) This paper will focus on resource adequacy and generation 
performance and availability as measures of reliability as only generation and fuel supply 
impacts will be examined in this paper.  
2.2.1 Resource adequacy  
NERC measures resource adequacy by calculating a planning reserve margin. The planning 
reserve margin compares “committed capacity” to “net internal demand”. Each regional 
entity has a different reference margin level based on their own regulatory requirements, 
however minimum reserve margins required by NERC are 10 for predominately hydro 
systems and 15 for predominately thermal systems (NERC, 2020). A reserve margin can 
indicate how much additional reserve capacity may be needed in the event of a generator 
or fuel supply issue. Renewable energy sources are becoming a larger share of electricity 
generation in the US (Cochran et al., 2015). However, resources such as wind and solar, 
have the potential to bring an additional issue of ramping to the grid. As these resources 
are variable and their generation can fluctuate in a short timeframe, the rate of increasing 
or decreasing hourly load becomes pertinent (Craig et al., 2020). Periods of high ramps can 
require the use of reserves. In the case of ramping, flexible reserves would provide the 
additional capacity to meet these needs within a 60 minute timeframe (Cole et al., 2018). 
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A variety of technologies can provide these reserves, however each technology has 
different ramp rates (Cole et al., 2018). Flexible reserves are the types of reserves discussed 
in this paper that can provide additional generation in times when ramping is needed.  
2.2.2 Generation performance and availability  
WEFOR, weighted-equivalent generation forced outage rate, is a measure of the 
probability that a generating unit will be unable to generate at full capacity at any time, due 
to an outage or derating (NERC, 2020). There is seasonal variability in when certain fuels 
are most reliable. Natural gas, specifically, has higher WEFOR measures during colder 
winter months, illustrating the point that fuel supply is potentially affected by weather 
patterns (NERC, 2020). More variable or extreme weather patterns would then be likely to 
affect a generator’s availability.   
2.2.3 Current planning  
NERC has identified “extreme natural events” as an emerging risk area pertaining to the 
reliability of the bulk power system (NERC, 2020). The recommendations to deal with 
extreme natural events effects on the grid are planning and modeling. According to the 
EDF, utilities currently plan only twenty years ahead when preparing for adjustments to 
their infrastructure, and most do not plan to harden their systems to withstand the effects 
of climate change (Webb et al., n.d.). A lack of certainty of the true effects of climate 
change on their system, as well as the lack of relevant data and the cost to enhance their 
system, are major obstacles to preparing for these changes (Webb et al., n.d.). Utilities that 
have started to implement these changes into their system have planned for effects such as 
storms and wildfires, however they are not planning for the more gradual effects of climate 
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change, such as increased temperatures (Webb et al., n.d.). Climate change effects may 
require an increase in more diverse installed capacity throughout the country to meet 
demand needs and compensate for reduced capacity from climate change effects, and it is 
currently not being planned for throughout most of the US.  
2.3 Relevance to Current Events  
The negative impacts of climate change on the conventional grid have already been felt 
throughout the US. This section explores three examples from the last decade in which 
extreme weather events played a part in widespread power outages.  
2.3.1 2011 and 2021 Texas outage 
In February 2011, Texas and other southwestern states experienced sustained temperatures 
below freezing, leading to generation outages and multiple instances of load shedding. 
From February 2 to February 4, a total of 4.4 million customers were affected by the 
outages (FERC, 2011). The root cause of these rolling blackouts in Texas was the failure 
or derating of their generating units, half of which were due to the cold (FERC, 2011). The 
severe cold caused sensing and water lines at plants to freeze, automatically tripping units 
offline. Power plants in Texas are generally not winterized to the extent of those located in 
colder climates; most units are not enclosed as to reduce heat accumulation in the summer, 
leaving the equipment susceptible to freezing in winter. Recommendations were put in 
place for winterizing this infrastructure, however little was done. In February 2021, 
extreme cold temperatures, 30 degrees lower than average, again wreaked havoc on Texas’ 
power grid, leaving 4.5 million customers in Texas without power. At its peak, about 40% 
of generation was offline in the state (Ball, 2021). Natural gas supply was reduced by 
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almost half as water/other liquids present in raw natural gas froze at the wellhead or in 
gathering lines (York, 2021). The flow of gas ceased at the production stage and 
subsequently, along with increased demand because of the extreme temperatures, as well 
as additional plant outages, there was little fuel available to deliver directly to customers 
or generate electricity.  
2.3.2 2020 California rolling blackouts 
On August 14 and 15, 2020, a subset of California’s population experienced rotating power 
outages. These affected about 500,000 customers on August 14th, and again on August 15th 
(Roth, 2020). It was the first occurrence of rolling blackouts due to insufficient capacity in 
California in almost twenty years (Gilbert & Bazilian, 2020). During this time, California 
was experiencing a record-breaking heat wave. With increasing penetration of solar that 
cannot generate electricity in the evening, and accelerated retirements of some fossil fuel 
generation, a lack of available generating resources combined with increased demand led 
to the need for load shedding to prevent more widespread outages (Roth, 2020). Multiple 
natural gas power plants tripped offline, likely from the high heat conditions, or were 
already out of service, likely from inadequate resource planning that did not anticipate the 
additional need for natural gas generation (Gilbert & Bazilian, 2020). As demonstrated in 
this case, long term management and planning is imperative to enhancing grid reliability. 
2.3.3 Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico 
In September 2017, Hurricane Maria, a category 4 hurricane, hit Puerto Rico causing 
widespread damage and power outages for 1.5 million people (Gallucci, 2018). A 
combination of damage to power plants, substations, and transmission lines from high 
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winds, flooding, and heavy rains led to the outages. These outages were not only 
widespread but lasted up to 180 days in some areas (Gallucci, 2018). Without power, 
markets, banks, and water treatment facilities were left inoperable, further exacerbating the 
living conditions of residents. Only 15% of Puerto Rico’s transmission lines were designed 
for a category 4 hurricane, indicating how new climate trends and storm intensities are not 
currently being incorporated into energy infrastructure planning (Gallucci, 2018). The 
conventional grid is vulnerable to these changes and they can have devastating 
consequences, as they did in Puerto Rico.  
2.4 State Profiles 
Four states were chosen to analyze their 2050 forecasted generation. These states exhibit 
different load curves, electricity and natural gas uses, and were chosen because of their 
reliance on climate-vulnerable fuels or their energy policies. Figures 1 and 2 provide an 
overview of these states’ use of electricity and natural gas.  
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Figure 1. 2019 electricity purchases per state by end use sector. Calculations 
completed using EIA data. 
 
Figure 2. 2019 natural gas consumption per state by end use sector. Calculations 




Louisiana has a robust industrial sector, which accounts for 60% of the natural gas 
consumption and 40% of electricity purchases in the state, making it the largest natural gas 
consumer per capita in the continental US (Louisiana - State Energy Profile Analysis, 
2021). Although the state uses an average share of electricity in the residential sector, 
Louisiana has the highest per capita residential electricity consumption in the US, as the 
majority of homes’ heating and cooling needs are met by electricity (Louisiana - State 
Energy Profile Analysis, 2021). Any grid outages are then likely to have a great impact on 
the residential and industrial sectors.  
Louisiana’s electricity generation is dominated by natural gas, Figure 3. Coal and nuclear 
also provide a large share of generation needs. The majority of Louisiana’s thermal power 
plants are located along the Mississippi River. Renewables, such as solar, hydro, and 
biomass, consist of a small portion of capacity. Louisiana currently only has one 
hydroelectric plant, and one proposed hydroelectric plant set to come online in 2023 (Form 
EIA-860 Detailed Data with Previous Form Data (EIA-860A/860B), 2020). The state 
imports about 20% of its electricity needs from out of state. 
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Figure 3. Projected (current and proposed) power plants in Louisiana in 2050 by 
fuel type and nameplate capacity. Mississippi River is shown in blue. Map is 
adapted from EIA form 860 (Form EIA-860 Detailed Data with Previous Form Data 
(EIA-860A/860B), 2020). 
Louisiana is also home to the Henry Hub, which transports almost 2 billion cubic feet of 
gas per day. The hub connects 12 pipelines and sets the pricing for “natural gas physical 
and futures trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange”(Louisiana - State Energy 
Profile Analysis, 2021). Louisiana also produces natural gas; its largest producing area is 
the Haynesville shale formation. Assuming the state consumes gas produced instate 
primarily, it receives its remaining natural gas needs most likely from basins in Texas 
(Burns & Grubert, 2021). Therefore, an extreme temperature event across this region could 
impact natural gas production and natural gas fired-electricity production instate, as well 
as where Louisiana likely receives the majority of its out of state produced gas. For this 
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analysis, I calculated impacts only on instate natural gas production or electricity 
generation.    
Currently, Louisiana has no renewable portfolio standards or targets (State Renewable 
Portfolio Standards and Goals, n.d.).  
2.4.2 California 
California’s commercial and residential sectors consume the majority of electricity in the 
state, Figure 1. California’s industrial sector consumed the largest share of natural gas in 
the state. California produces little natural gas. It imports its gas from basins located in 
Canada, the southwest, and Rocky Mountain region (California - State Energy Profile 
Analysis, 2021). 
California’s 2050 projected power plants are dominated by solar and hydropower, Figure 
4. Natural gas fired power plants also consist of a large share of electricity generation; 20% 
as of 2019 (California - State Energy Profile Analysis, 2021). The state’s existing nuclear 
plants are scheduled to be retired by 2025 (Form EIA-860 Detailed Data with Previous 
Form Data (EIA-860A/860B), 2020). The state’s hydroelectric plants, although they 
contribute a large share of overall capacity, have been variable in their actual generation in 
the past due to climate changes. As of 2019, the state received 28% of its electricity from 
out of state, mostly from the Pacific Northwest and Southwest (California - State Energy 
Profile Analysis, 2021). Climate change impacts in these regions can then affect the supply 
of electricity in California.  
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Figure 4. Projected (current and proposed) power plants in California in 2050 by 
fuel type and nameplate capacity. Map is adapted from EIA form 860 (Form EIA-
860 Detailed Data with Previous Form Data (EIA-860A/860B), 2020).  
California’s utilities have begun to incorporate the effects of climate change into their 
resource planning. As of 2020, the California Public Utilities Commission has required 
utilities in the state to submit climate vulnerability studies of their service territory and 
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infrastructure every four years (Webb et al., n.d.). California has also adopted a renewables 
portfolio standard in 2002. Currently, it requires that 60% of the state’s electricity sales are 
to be from renewable sources by 2030 and for all electricity to originate from carbon free 
resources by 2045 (California Public Utilities Commission, n.d.).  
2.4.3 New York 
New York has one of the lowest per capita electricity consumption rates in the nation (New 
York - State Energy Profile Analysis, 2020). The commercial and residential sectors 
consume the most electricity, Figure 1, with the commercial sector accounting for almost 
50% of electricity purchases. 
New York does produce some natural gas, however the majority of natural gas is imported 
from Pennsylvania, specifically from the Appalachian basin (Burns & Grubert, 2021). 
Three out of every five households use natural gas for heating, as of 2019 (New York - State 
Energy Profile Analysis, 2020). With a majority of households in the state relying on 
natural gas directly for heating needs, a loss of supply from instate production, or 
neighboring states, specifically wells in the Appalachian basin, can cut off direct gas supply 
to households.  
New York’s projected power plants in 2050 consist of a large amount of natural gas and 
hydroelectric capacity, mostly in Long Island and along Lake Ontario, and small capacity 
wind and solar. New York’s largest nuclear power plant at Indian Point, outside of New 
York, is set to retire in 2021, leaving three nuclear plants operating in the northern part of 
the state (Form EIA-860 Detailed Data with Previous Form Data (EIA-860A/860B), 2020). 
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Figure 5. Projected (current and proposed) power plants in New York in 2050 by 
fuel type and nameplate capacity. Map is adapted from EIA form 860 (Form EIA-
860 Detailed Data with Previous Form Data (EIA-860A/860B), 2020). 
Con Edison, New York City’s electric and gas provider, is one of few utilities to perform 
a comprehensive review of climate change effects on their infrastructure in their “Climate 
Vulnerability Study” (Webb et al., n.d.). Additionally, New York state adopted a 
Renewable Portfolio Standard in 2004 (NYSERDA, n.d.). The goal was to increase New 
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York’s consumption of renewable energy. The goals have increased through the years, with 
the most recent standard being 70% of electricity must be produced by renewable sources 
by 2030 (NYSERDA, n.d.). New York plans to achieve this through offshore wind 
development; five offshore wind projects off of Long Island are currently in development, 
with an expected capacity of 4,300 MW (New York’s Offshore Wind Projects, n.d.). New 
York is also assessing the ability of offshore wind in the Great Lakes region to provide 
additional capacity.  
2.4.4 Washington 
Washington is unique in that is relies very heavily on one fuel source: water. The state 
typically meets two-thirds of its electricity needs with hydropower (Washington - State 
Energy Profile Analysis, n.d.). The residential sector accounts for the largest share of 
electricity consumption, Figure 1.  
Washington does not produce any natural gas and receives all of its natural gas from 
Canada (Washington - State Energy Profile Analysis, n.d.). The state consumes the 
majority of its natural gas to generate electricity and in the residential sector, largely to 
meet residents’ heating needs, Figure 2.  
In 2050, it is expected that hydropower will provide the most capacity, Figure 6. The 
majority of these plants are fed by the Columbia River. Smaller capacity wind and solar 
farms dot the southern part of the state. Natural gas fired power plants can be found in the 
western half of the state. Washington only has one nuclear plant, the Columbia nuclear 
plant along the Columbia River. The state’s current two coal plants are scheduled to retire 











Washington adopted its renewable energy standard in 2006. Currently, its goals, as stated 
in the 2019 Clean Energy Transformation Act, require 100% clean electricity by 2045, in 
addition to the elimination of all coal electricity generation by 2025.   
 
  
Figure 6. Projected (current and proposed) power plants in Washington in 2050 by 
fuel type and nameplate capacity. Columbia River is shown in blue. Map is adapted 
from EIA form 860  
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CHAPTER 3. METHODS 
3.1 Outage Data 
The first step in determining the effects of climate change on grid reliability included 
analyzing historical outage data. Archived data from the EIA, from 2002 through 2020, 
was analyzed to determine the root cause of all reported outages (Electric Power Monthly, 
n.d.). Based on information in chapter 2, the two main root causes of outages from potential 
climate change effects seem to stem from fuel supply or transmission issues. These 
keywords were searched in “Cause of outage”. These outages were also identified by 
month they began, as well as hour of the day they began.  
3.2 State Profiles 
Specific states were chosen to be analyzed based on their electricity generation profiles. 
NREL’s Cambium tool calculates the projected capacity and generation of various energy 
technologies in each state from 2020 to 2050 (Cambium | Standard Scenarios 2020 | 
Cambium Scenarios (Hourly and Annual Data), n.d.). Note that this data is limited by all 
the potential errors and uncertainties associated with NREL’s Cambium model. Additional 
data, such as electricity imports (electricity imported from out of state), is available by 
balancing authority. Cambium documentation provides information on which balancing 
authorities comprise each state (Gagnon et al., 2020). This data was combined by balancing 
authority to obtain a 2050 generation mix profile for each state. The year 2050 was chosen 
as it is assumed that climate change effects will be most pronounced during this time 
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assuming a “business as usual” emissions scenario. Here, we define load as “busbar_load” 
in the NREL dataset and generation is defined as the sum of “Imports” and “Generation”.  
The ability of a state to meet its loads with available generation is determined by calculating 
the planning reserve margin per hour. Although PRMs are generally calculated using peak 
capacity, in this case, hourly loads were used for the calculation, therefore hourly 
generation was assumed to be the “peak capacity” for that hour. See equation 1. Calculated 
PRMs were averaged for each hour of each month. PRMs were then averaged further for 
each hour of each season. Four seasons, summer (June, July, August), fall (September, 
October, November), winter (December, January, February), and spring (March, April, 
May), are used to assess trends.  
                       𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛 =  
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑀𝑊ℎ)−𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑(𝑀𝑊ℎ)
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 (𝑀𝑊ℎ)
× 100                           (1) 
To determine ramping needs, the percent difference of hourly loads was calculated, 
equation 2, where n is the hour of the day in which potential ramping needs are being 
assessed.  
                                       𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔 =
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑛+1−𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑛
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑛
× 100                                            (2) 
The amount of flexible reserves available to meet any ramping needs was calculated using 
the hourly flexible reserves for each state provided by NREL. Flexible reserves were 
averaged for each hour of each month, and then each hour of each season. They were 
divided by hourly average seasonal loads to calculate the amount of flexible reserves 
available as a percent of load. This was to determine how much flexible reserve, as a 
function of load, is available during each season throughout the day.  
 25 
For extreme heat events, loss of capacity due to limited water availability and increased 
intake temperatures were calculated using values calculated by van Vliet, 2012. Thermal 
power plants with once through cooling systems are expected to experience a 12-16% 
reduction in capacity based on these effects from 2031-2060. Plants with recirculating 
cooling systems expect a 4.4-5.9% capacity reduction from 2031-2060. All technologies 
that are considered thermal were considered to be affected: nuclear, geothermal, biomass, 
natural gas, coal, and oil/gas/steam. Capacities for all plants were obtained from the NREL 
Cambium dataset. Reduced capacities for each technology were calculated for the 
minimum and maximum reductions of each cooling system scenario. If hourly generation 
exceeded the reduced capacity value, it was assumed the reduced capacity value was the 
actual amount generated that hour. Any hourly generation lower than the reduced capacity 
value was assumed to be generated that hour. New PRMs were then calculated with these 
reduced generation values to compare to original PRMs to determine the effects of these 
capacity reductions. These calculations were only performed for summer months when 
extreme heat events are most likely to occur. 
Similar calculations were done to calculate the effects of extreme heat on natural gas 
combined cycle power plants. It is estimated that thermal power plants will experience a 
1-2% capacity loss per 1°C increase in temperature (Sieber, 2013). All states have little 
thermal power plant capacity in 2050 except natural gas combined cycle plants so only 
these plants were analyzed. Assuming a capacity loss of 2% per degree Celsius, and an 
average summer temperature of 90°F, an eight degree Celsius increase is equivalent to a 
temperature of 105°F and reduced capacity of 16%.  These calculations were only 
performed for summer months when extreme heat events are most likely to occur. 
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Increased electricity demand due to extreme heat was also incorporated. Louisiana’s 
maximum increase in electricity demand in 2050 due to heat is 35.8% (Allen et al., 2016). 
California, New York, and Washington’s worst case scenario 2050 increase in electricity 
demand is 9, 7.5, and 4.5% respectively (McFarland et al., 2015). If hourly generation 
exceeded the reduced capacity value, it was assumed the reduced capacity value was the 
actual amount generated that hour. Any hourly generation lower than the reduced capacity 
value was assumed to be generated that hour. New PRMs were calculated to determine the 
impact of these effects on each state’s reserve margins.  
For hydroelectric power plants, calculations from a previous study indicating projected 
hydropower generation reductions seasonally in 2050, in different regions of the US, were 
used (Boehlert et al., 2016). This work specified generation reductions for California. 
Reductions specified for the Mid Atlantic were used for New York. Similarly, reductions 
specified for the Pacific Northwest were used for Washington and reductions specified for 
the Lower Mississippi for Louisiana. The maximum generation reductions for each state 
were chosen and are specified in Table 1. The reductions calculated under the reference 
scenario, which specifies a “business as usual” emissions scenario, were used. These 
reductions were applied to the hourly generation data provided by NREL. New PRMs were 
calculated to determine the effect of hydropower generation reductions on each state’s 




Table 1. Maximum projected percent reduction in hydropower generation for each 
state (Boehlert et al., 2016). 
State Season Percent reduction in generation 










Vulnerabilities corresponding to the effects of extreme cold events on the natural gas fuel 
supply were identified by calculating the available generation to meet demand with a 50% 
natural gas supply loss. 1% of natural gas supply loss was assumed to correlate to a 1% 
decrease in natural gas combined cycle generation. New generation values with this loss 
were calculated and average PRMs were calculated seasonally. During the 2021 Texas 
extreme cold event, 45% of natural gas supply was lost due to freezing at the wellhead or 
in pipelines (York, 2021). 50% loss in this case is a realistic scenario. This supply loss was 
only attributed to natural gas electricity generated within the state; electricity imported 
from other states or abroad was assumed to not be affected.  
Power plant information was obtained from EIA form 860 for 2019, the most recent year 
for which final data was available as of this writing (Form EIA-860 Detailed Data with 
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Previous Form Data (EIA-860A/860B), 2020, p. 860). Plant and generator data was 
aggregated to calculate nameplate capacity, fuel source, water source, and 
latitude/longitude of each plant. Specifically, data at the plant level includes the 
latitude/longitude and water source, while data at the generator level includes nameplate 
capacity, fuel source, proposed generators, and retirement dates. These two datasets were 
combined using each generators “Plant Code” to get the fuel type associated with each 
plant. Nameplate capacities of generators with the same plant code were summed to get the 
total nameplate capacity of each plant. According to EIA-860 information, which may be 
incomplete, generators that are planned to be retired before 2050 were eliminated and any 
generators proposed to be constructed prior to 2050 were included.  
The power plant information was inputted to ArcGIS. Climate projection data from 
climatetoolbox.org was used to show regional variability in climate per state (University 
of California Merced, n.d.). These projections are an aggregation of 20 climate models. 
The projections are downscaled to 4 km resolution for the contiguous US. All projections 
were using the “Multi-model mean derived from 20 downscaled CMIP5 models” under the 
higher emissions (RCP 8.5) scenario from 2040-2069. The Representative Concentration 
Pathway, RCP 8.5, scenario is considered the worst-case scenario by the IPCC. It predicts 
a radiative forcing value of 8.5 W/m2 in which emissions continue to rise in the 21st century. 
Projected number of days with a heat index of 105°F or greater during summer months 
(June, July, and August) was used. River/stream shapefiles were obtained from ArcGIS 
Hub (USA Rivers and Streams, 2020).  
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS 
4.1 Outage Trends 
Figures 7 through 9 depict archived outage data from EIA’s Electric Power Monthly 
(Electric Power Monthly, n.d.). Figure 7 shows the number of outages by year per root 
cause: fuel supply or transmission.  
 
Figure 7. "Major disturbances" of the US power grid from 2002 through 2020. Data 
was collected from archived data from EIA’s Electric Power Monthly. Orange 
indicates an outage caused by a fuel supply issue. Blue indicates an outage caused by 





Figure 8 utilizes the same data but aggregates the data by month and root cause.  
 
Figure 8. Outages from 2002-2020 per month by root cause: fuel supply or 
transmission. Data was collected from archived data from EIA’s Electric Power 
Monthly. Orange indicates an outage caused by a fuel supply issue. Blue indicates 
an outage caused by a transmission issue.  





Figure 9. Outages from 2002-2020 per hour of the day by root cause: fuel supply or 
transmission. Data was collected from archived data from EIA’s Electric Power 
Monthly. Orange indicates an outage caused by a fuel supply issue. Blue indicates 
an outage caused by a transmission issue. 
4.2 Case Studies  
4.2.1 Seasonal patterns for all states  
Figures 10 and 11 were compiled to assess each state’s projected typical load and reserve 






















Figure 110. 2050 daily average seasonal loads. The load in MWh is plotted against 
each hour of the day, 0 through 23. Summer is indicated in blue, fall is indicated in 




Figure 12. 2050 daily average seasonal planning reserve margins. The planning 
reserve margin is plotted against each hour of the day, 0 through 23. Summer is 
indicated in blue, fall is indicated in red, winter is indicated in black, and spring is 
indicated in green. 
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4.2.2 Potential ramping needs and available reserves  
Figure 12 calculates the potential ramping needs using the formula described in the 
Methods section.  
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Figure 13. 2050 average daily seasonal potential ramping needs. The percent load 
difference per hour is plotted against each hour of the day, 0 through 23. Summer is 
indicated in blue, fall is indicated in red, winter is indicated in black, and spring is 
indicated in green. 
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Times in which ramping generation may be needed can be fulfilled with flexible reserves. 
The share of flexible reserves as a percentage of load is shown in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 14. 2050 available flexible reserves to meet ramping needs, per season, per 
hour. Flexible reserve, as a percentage of load at that time, is plotted against each 
hour of the day, 0 through 23. Summer is indicated in blue, fall is indicated in red, 
winter is indicated in black, and spring is indicated in green. 
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4.2.3 Extreme heat impacts on thermoelectric power plants  
Figure 14 shows the compounding effects of increased electricity demand and decreased 
natural gas combined cycle power plant capacity in the summer from extreme heat for each 
state.  
 
Figure 15. Average hourly summer reserve margins per state after accounting for 
increased demand and decreased natural gas combined cycle power plant capacity 
from extreme heat events. Louisiana is indicated in green, California is indicated in 
yellow, New York is indicated in gray, and Washington is indicated in blue.  
Figures 15 and 16 show the regional variability of extreme heat in California and Louisiana. 
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Figure 16. California’s natural gas power plants (orange) by nameplate capacity 
and projected number of days in 2050 with a heat index of 105° F or greater. 
Projected heat index data was obtained from climatetoolbox.org. 
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Figure 17. Louisiana’s natural gas power plants (orange) by nameplate capacity and 
projected number of days in 2050 with a heat index of 105° F or greater. Projected 
heat index data was obtained from climatetoolbox.org. 
4.2.4 Hydroelectric power plants  
Figure 17 indicates the projected effects of reduced hydropower generation in the summer 





Figure 18. Average hourly reserve margins per season for California and 
Washington after accounting for projected 2050 decreases in hydropower 
generation according to the values outlined in Table 1. Reserve margins without any 
climate effects are indicated by solid lines. Reserve margins including decreased 
hydropower generation are indicated by dashed lines. Summer is indicated in blue. 
Fall is indicated in orange.  
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4.2.5 Extreme cold event effects on natural gas supply loss  
Figure 18 depicts the projected effects of a 50% loss of natural gas supply for each state in 
















Figure 19. Projected average hourly reserve margins in winter and fall for all states 
after accounting for 50% loss in natural gas supply. Reserve margins without any 
climate effects are indicated by solid lines. Reserve margins including decreased 
hydropower generation are indicated by dashed lines. Winter is indicated in black. 
Fall is indicated in orange. 
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION 
This section will discuss the results depicted in chapter 4 to analyze how these climate 
effects may be impacting the future reliability of the conventional grid for Louisiana, 
California, New York, and Washington. 
5.1 Trends in vulnerability from past outages  
Outages in the US due to fuel supply or transmission issues have increased from 2002 to 
2020, Figure 7. Transmission related outages have been increasing, specifically in the past 
five years, with fuel supply outages slightly increasing, but overall remaining steady. 
Historically, transmission related outages have peaked in July, August, and October, Figure 
8. This time of year corresponds to hurricane season and increased storms. Fuel supply 
outages have historically peaked in January, February, and July, the times of year most 
likely to experience extreme heat or cold. Additionally, fuel supply related outages tend to 
begin in the morning hours, Figure 9. Extreme temperature events are when outages are 
most likely due to fuel supply, but also when electric demand is highest and most needed 
for its customers.  
5.2 State Profiles 
5.2.1 2050 projected load curves and planning reserve margins  
Each state’s projected load curve varies depending on their end use of electricity, whether 
that be in the residential, commercial, industrial, or transportation sectors (Hayes, 2013). 
Louisiana utilizes the largest share of electricity for the industrial sector (Figure 1), as 
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illustrated in its projected load curve in Figure 10. Loads remain relatively steady 
throughout the day, except in summer. Louisiana’s projected PRMs are highest in the 
winter, when it experiences its lowest loads., Figure 11, and are lowest during times of 
highest loads.  
California and New York’s commercial sector utilizes the largest share of electricity in 
each state (Figure 1). This is consistent with their seasonal load curves, Figure 10, in which 
loads rapidly increase in the morning, remain steady, and decline in the late afternoon 
(Figure 10). Based on California’s projected PRMs (Figure 11), it is very vulnerable to any 
outages in the early morning and late evening hours of the fall and winter. Its highest PRMs 
correspond to the hours in which the state is likely to experience its highest loads, unlike 
in Louisiana. Overall, California has the lowest projected PRMs of all states analyzed. 
New York’s projected PRMs (Figure 11) are less consistent among seasons, with summer 
being most vulnerable throughout the day. There are not real hourly trends between 
seasons. 
Washington’s largest electricity user is the residential sector (Figure 1). Its load curve is 
consistent with typical load curves associated with the residential sector in that it has two 
load peaks: one in the morning and one in the evening. Washington has the highest overall 
projected PRMs, Figure 11. Winter and fall are the most vulnerable seasons with the lowest 
PRMs, however these are still much higher than those for other states, or the minimum 
NERC margins of 10 or 15 (NERC, 2020).  
All states except Washington are projected to experience their highest loads during the 
summer. Washington sees its highest electric loads during the winter (Figure 10).  
 46 
Outages more likely to happen during the summer would likely impact the most people in 
New York, California, and Louisiana because this time of year is when these states 
experience their peak loads. These higher loads indicate higher electricity demand. 
Washington, however, would be most vulnerable during the winter.  
During the summer, extreme heat events will increase demand, stressing electrical 
equipment, and decreasing the efficiency of thermal power plants. Additionally, if these 
states are likely to experience drought or decreased precipitation during the summer, they 
are susceptible to generators shutting down from low water intake. These effects, 
compounded with the highest projected loads during the summer, can make the power grid 
in Louisiana, California, and New York vulnerable. On the other hand, extreme cold events 
could do the same in Washington. All states, except Louisiana, also have the smallest 
margins and are most vulnerable during the early morning and late evening hours. This is 
similar to the pattern seen in the historical outage data, Figure 9, in which fuel supply 
outages have historically occurred in the early morning hours.  
5.2.2 Ramping 
Figure 12 shows the different ramping needs of each state. All states have similar ramping 
patterns that are relatively consistent seasonally. Louisiana and Washington have the 
lowest potential ramping needs. Louisiana has steadier load curves, which is consistent 
with less potential for ramping needs. California has the most potential vulnerability for 
providing ramping generation as hourly loads differ between 20-40%, specifically between 
7 – 10 AM. Summer consistently has the greatest load increases except in Washington 
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state. In all states, ramping needs are highest in the morning hours, typically with another 
winter peak in the late afternoon.  
Ramping is generally needed when a state has many generation resources that are variable. 
Wind and solar are considered variable sources as generation can fluctuate quickly based 
on changes in the weather (Craig et al., 2020). If there is a large increase in demand, certain 
generators will need to be able to come online to provide additional generation. California 
and New York are anticipated to have substantial wind and solar capacity in 2050, Figures 
4 and 5. They also have the highest ramping needs, Figure 12. This could pose a potential 
problem in meeting demand in the future. 
5.2.3 Reserves 
Flexible reserves can fill the gap needed when demand increases quickly. Each state, except 
Louisiana in the early morning and late evenings, has some amount of flexible reserve 
available throughout the day, Figure 13. Seasonally, there are not consistent patterns 
between each state. California and New York have the greatest amount of reserves 
available, while Washington has the smallest reserves as a percentage of load. Louisiana 
and Washington, which have the lower reserves, also have smaller ramping needs. Flexible 
reserves are generally available in the morning hours in which ramping needs are highest 
for all states. 
5.2.4 Extreme heat impacts on natural gas combined cycle plants  
Extreme heat decreases the capacity of natural gas combined cycle power plants. Projected 
PRMs for each state in the summer are shown in Figure 14. These PRMs combined the 
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effects of increased electricity demand due to extreme heat, as well as decreased capacity 
of natural gas combined cycle power plants due to extreme heat.  
Louisiana is projected to be most affected by these effects, as its PRMs are negative from 
6 AM through the rest of the day. California and New York also have lower PRMs, 
indicating that they are vulnerable to these compounded effects throughout the day. 
Washington is very minimally affected, and has sufficient additional capacity to maintain 
a high reserve margin.  
Projected generation in the summer for these plants does exceed this reduced capacity in 
New York and Washington, however, California and Louisiana are more likely to be 
affected. If hourly loads remained similar to their baseline, this effect would be small 
(decreasing PRMs by <1). However, loads are likely to increase during an extreme heat 
event. There is much regional variability in these states’ temperature patterns, Figures 15 
and 16. Louisiana’s entire natural gas fired power plant system is more likely to be affected 
by extreme heat, while only a small subset of California’s natural gas plants in the southeast 
portion of the state are likely to experience heat indexes over 105° F. The majority of 
California’s natural gas plants are located in regions with zero projected days of a heat 
index of 105° F or greater. Louisiana, however, has a projected minimum of 39 days per 
year with a heat index of 105° F or greater. Louisiana’s natural gas plants are more likely 
to be affected by heat than California’s. 
5.2.5 Extreme heat and drought conditions on cooling water for thermal power plants 
Thermal power plants are particularly susceptible to climate change effects as many rely 
on cooling water. As temperatures increase, increases in intake cooling water temperatures, 
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especially from surface water sources, reduce the capacity of thermal power plants, as 
efficiency of the plant is decreased. Additionally, low stream flow, increases in drought 
conditions, and/or decreased precipitation, affect the water supply in rivers, lakes, 
reservoirs, etc. that are used for cooling water. Low cooling water supplies can also reduce 
the capacity of thermal power plants or shut them down completely. Depending on the 
cooling system used at the plant (once through or recirculating), low supply and increased 
temperatures of cooling water can reduce the capacity of thermal power plants from 4.4 – 
16%.  
Louisiana and Washington are similar in that only natural gas combined cycle plants with 
once through cooling systems would be affected by these capacity reductions. These effects 
are minimal compared to total generation.  
In California, these reductions would impact natural gas combined cycle, geothermal, and 
biomass plants, however natural gas combined cycle plants would only be affected if they 
have once-through cooling systems. Capacity reductions to recirculation cooling systems 
were projected to be too small for natural gas combined cycle plants to affect generation.  
In the worst-case scenario, 16% capacity reductions for thermal power plants, only New 
York’s biomass plants, which provide a small portion of generation, would be affected.  
The issue of increased cooling water temperatures and/or low cooling water supply is real, 
and should be planned for, however with proper resource planning, it is projected that in 
2050 these states will have enough non-thermal electricity generation sources that these 
effects will be minimal.  
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5.2.6 Hydroelectric plants  
Decreases in hydropower generation affect different states in different seasons.  
Louisiana is minimally affected by any decreases in hydropower generation because it is 
projected to have a small amount of hydropower capacity. Louisiana’s hydropower plants 
generate a maximum of 146 MWh in 2050. With an average generation of 21,416 MWh in 
2050, any reduction in hydropower generation will have minimal effects overall.  
California will experience slight decreases in their reserve margins during the summer and 
fall, Figure 17. However, reserve margins are already low in the early morning and late 
evening hours in the fall. A decrease in hydropower generation in the fall can make 
California’s grid even more vulnerable to outages if there are additional issues. 
New York is projected to react similarly to Louisiana. In 2050, New York’s plants are 
projected to generate a maximum of 4,211 MWh, while the state’s 2050 average generation 
is over 26,000 MWh. A 3% reduction in generation of hydropower in New York will have 
minimal effects on its overall ability to meet demand.  
Washington continues to have high reserve margins with or without any decrease in 
hydropower generation in the summer or fall. However, the early morning and late evening 
hours in the summer are most affected by this decrease in hydropower generation.  
5.2.7 Natural gas supply 
A disruption in natural gas supply will affect those that use natural gas-fired electricity and 
those that use natural gas directly for other needs. All states consume about 20-30% of their 
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natural gas supply for electricity generation (Figure 4). A loss of 50% natural gas supply 
will affect not only electricity generation, but customers that use processed natural gas 
directly. In Louisiana, this is overwhelmingly the industrial sector. Over 70% of 
Louisiana’s natural gas is used in the industrial sector (Figure 5), therefore a disruption in 
supply would affect this sector more so than the residential or commercial sectors in the 
state. New York (Figure 5), however, consumes the most natural gas in the residential 
sector; a supply disruption would affect residents more so than the commercial or industrial 
sectors.  
Louisiana is most severely affected by natural gas supply loss (Figure 18). During the 
winter and fall, a 50% loss ensures that there is not enough generation to meet load needs 
throughout the entire day.  
California would also be left unable to meet its load needs from 3 PM until 7 AM. During 
this time, the extensive solar resources in California (Figure 4) would not be available 
without a storage system.  
New York state would be affected, however not to the extent of Louisiana and California. 
If New York’s other resources remain online, it is not likely to experience outages. Its 
reserve margins would be much lower, and it would be more susceptible to outages if some 
generation is lost.  
Washington is the least affected. Its reserve margins slightly decrease with 50% gas supply 
loss; however they are still high enough that there is plenty of generation to meet its load 
needs. Washington however would be affected in sectors that use natural gas directly. 
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Besides the electric power sector, this is mostly the residential and commercial sectors 
(Figure 2).  
5.3 Limitations 
All calculations in this work are based on projected electricity load and generation 
estimates provided by NREL’s Cambium dataset. These values are subject to all potential 
uncertainties and errors associated with their model. Any imported electricity and natural 
gas was assumed to not be affected by these climate change effects in these calculations. 
Only electricity generated instate was assumed to be affected by these climate effects. 
Additionally, all capacity reductions, generation reductions, increases in demand, etc. are 
subject to variability depending on the methods used to calculate these values. This work 
consistently used the worst-case emissions scenario to calculate worst case scenario effects. 
Depending on measures taken until 2050, this may not be an accurate reflection of 









CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
The effects of future climate impacts on electricity generation and fuel supply vary 
geographically, seasonally, and hourly. These factors must be considered when planning 
to ensure the future reliability of the grid. Additionally, electricity outages may affect those 
differently in each state depending on the main use of electricity in the state. Similar is true 
for natural gas. Outages that affect more of the residential vs. industrial sector will have 
different social and economic impacts.  Certain seasons or times of the day may contribute 
to more impactful outages than others. Regional variability in climate change effects is 
important and more work in states expecting more extreme weather must be done to 
quantify the potential effects on current energy infrastructure. Additional issues due to 
climate change, such as sea level rise and increased and more intense storms should also 
be assessed regionally to determine impacts on infrastructure. Each state studied, except 
Louisiana, currently has policies in effect to shift towards mostly renewable sources by 
2050. These policies should only strengthen the resiliency of each state’s grid, if planned 
correctly. However, as seen with California, that may not always be the case. Fuel mix also 
influences the future reliability of the grid. Heavy reliance on one particular fuel source, as 
seen in Louisiana with natural gas, or Washington with hydropower, may not imply that 
the state is susceptible to reliability issues, as Washington consistently had the highest 
projected reserve margins in each case. A combination of renewable energy policy, shifts 
away from fossil fuel energy sources that are more susceptible to heat, cold, and drought 
effects, as well as robust planning to ensure adequate reserves during times of increasing 
loads will likely affect how resilient the power grid is in these states in the future.  
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